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Abstract 
 
Applying a Barro-style model of endogenous growth to a fifty-year panel of states from 1957 
to 2007, We examine the extent to which expenditures on public education and infrastructure— 
together with the taxes necessary to support them— enhance or impede the steady-state growth 
of state and local economies, as measured by per capita personal income. Our findings suggest 
that the independent effect of tax expenditures on either public infrastructure or education alone 
is significantly negative, but the complementary effect of each on the other is positive enough to 
make their combined effect significantly positive— except at large scales, where we find 
diseconomies, consistent with the ‘growth hill’ predicted by theory. Policy effects are identified 
empirically using a recursive structure with very long lags, GMM/instrumental variables, and 
controls for both fixed and time-varying heterogeneity. Results are robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications.
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 Introduction 
  Economic crisis, public infrastructure and education 
The economic crisis of 2008-2009 brought to the forefront the political and economic 
question of whether public expenditures on education or infrastructure stimulate economic 
growth – either in the short-term, cyclical sense, or in the steady state. Applying empirical 
specifications of a Barro (1990)-style  model of endogenous growth to a fifty-year panel of states 
from 1957 to 2007, we examine the extent to which expenditures on public infrastructure and 
education– together with the taxes necessary to support them—enhance or impede the growth of 
state and local economies, as measured by per capita personal income.  We are particularly 
interested in the possible complementarity between public investments in human capital and 
other public infrastructure. 
  Distinction  from prior studies 
Prior studies (e.g. Cohen and Paul (2004), Evans and Karras (1994), Duffy-Deno and 
Eberts (1991), and Pereira (2000), are typically based on a regional production function, and 
often find significantly positive effects separately for education or public infrastructure.1 Our 
findings suggest that the independent effect of tax expenditures on either public education or 
infrastructure alone is significantly negative, but the complementary effect of each on the other 
is positive enough to make their total effect significantly positive— except at large scales, where 
we find the diseconomies predicted by theory. Our findings are consistent with the 
agglomeration-type economies found by Cohen and Paul (2004), the complementarities among 
                                                 
1 Evans and Karras (1994) find either insignificant or negative effects for public infrastructure, and 
positive effects only for education. Distinguishing between infrastructure maintenance and new 
investment, Kalaitzidakis, et. al. (2005) find positive effects on Canadian growth for expenditures for 
maintenance of public infrastructure, but in this case, one might worry about spurious pro-cyclical 
correlations between maintenance expenditures and economic growth. 
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various forms of both public and private capital found by Pereira (2000)—as well as the 
complementarity between education and institutional infrastructure found by Hanushek (2007) 
for a panel of developing countries. Even so, our study is distinguished from these and other 
prior studies by four key features: 
 Opportunity cost 
 
First, unlike production function based studies, we account explicitly for the opportunity cost 
of increased tax expenditures on public education or infrastructure via an explicit model of 
endogenous growth and a fully specified government budget constraint; A number of studies, 
notably including the  important work on cities by Edward Glaeser, e.g. Glaeser et. al. (2000) 
find for example, that higher initial levels of education are related to higher subsequent growth, 
but one cannot conclude from this that higher tax expenditures on public education will have 
similar results, in part because one does not know the opportunity cost. Indeed,  Glaeser et. al. 
(2000) find that the only government expenditure category correlated with city growth is 
sanitation. (Here, we estimate growth effects of state and local expenditures on public 
infrastructure and education, while accounting for the opportunity cost (in terms of growth) of 
the corresponding taxes. By fully specifying the budget constraint, one can gauge the opportunity 
cost of a change in any element of the budget, net of the effect of a compensating change in any 
other element. Helms (1985), Barro (1989), and Mofidi-Stone (1990). 
Identification of policy effects  
Second, the fifty years of panel data enable us to identify the steady-state effects of public 
education and infrastructure on growth using a recursive structure, very long, generation-length 
lags, GMM instrumental variables, and controls for both time-varying and fixed effects to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity across both states and periods.  This approach mitigates 
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issues of endogeneity and spurious correlation that plague studies of the effects of regional fiscal 
policies:  
Explicit model of endogenous growth 
Third, our empirical specifications are drawn from an explicit model of endogenous 
growth: In the Barro (1990) model, tax expenditures on productive infrastructure and other 
activities increase steady-state growth as long as the complementarity between private capital 
and public infrastructure is sufficient to raise the after-tax return to private capital above the 
private rate of time preference.  
Growth hills and complementarity 
Fourth, we focus on an additional source of possible complementarity: between public 
infrastructure and education. We focus as well on a related phenomenon predicted in the Barro 
model: The marginal effect of taxes exhibits a ‘growth hill’— that is, positive when the negative 
effect of an increase in initially low taxes is more than offset by the positive effects of increased 
expenditures on (scarce) productive public goods, but eventually negative when (high) taxes are 
raised even higher to spend on (now more abundant) productive public goods; (the effect passes 
through zero in between). We find unique evidence for just this kind of growth hill.  
Theoretical background 
 
Unlike the neoclassical growth model, where fiscal effects alter the level of the long-run 
output path, the Barro endogenous growth model permits fiscal effects to alter the slope of the 
long-run output path, as illustrated for example in Barro  (1990).  The key to endogenous growth 
in the Barro model is complementarities between private capital and publicly provided 
‘productive’ goods, expressed in the following way: There are n producers, each producing 
output (y) according to the production function: 
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y = Ak(1-a)ga         (1) 
where A is a positive constant, k is private capital, g is a publicly provided input complementary 
to private capital, and a is between 0 and 1.  The government funds its budget with a proportional 
tax on output at the rate r.  The balanced-budget government budget constraint is therefore:
 n g + C = r ny         (2) 
 Where C is government-provided consumption, i.e. ‘non-productive’ goods.2   
      Private capital is endogenously determined in the Barro model, hence is not an 
independent variable determining growth.  Thus, output growth in the steady state depends on 
(unobserved) parameters in production and utility), the tax rate (r), and the ratio of expenditures 
on public inputs to output (g/ny). One may then use eq. (2), the government budget constraint  to 
substitute for the tax rate r, which leaves all other budget elements in the equation for growth 
except taxes, so that the effect of a change in any one budget element is measured against the 
effect of a compensating change in taxes. Of course, one could substitute for any other budget 
element instead, but in the present case, use of a corresponding change in taxes yields estimates 
of the effects of changes in other budget elements net of the opportunity cost of the effect of a 
compensating change in taxes. This approach is then typically used to motivate a static or 
dynamic linear empirical equation, as in Barro (1989), or Bleaney,  Gemmell, and Kneller 
(2001,1999 ). Here, we focus first, on isolating the possibly complementary effects of public 
education and infrastructure, and then incorporate closely related issues of Barro’s nonlinear 
growth hill. Complementarities between public and private capital and among types of public 
capital are illustrated by the following adaptation of eq. (1): 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, one could also incorporate a deficit (or surplus). Doing so offers little gain in the context of U.S. 
states. For U.S. states, deficits and surpluses are typically small, less than one percent of personal income, so for 
simplicity we abstract from a non-zero deficit or surplus.  However, we include the deficit/surplus as one of several 
auxiliary control variables, and results are not sensitive to whether or not it is included. 
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1 2 1 21
1 2
a a a ay Ak g g− −=       (1b) 
where g1 and g2 represent expenditures (as a % of output) on public infrastructure and education, 
respectively.  As before, k represents private capital, which is endogenously determined. 
Equation (1b) maintains Barro’s central assumption of constant returns to scale for private and 
all types of public capital together.3  
Spatial equilibrium with common pools of capital and labor 
Growth arises endogenously in the Barro model as private capital accumulates via savings.  In 
the context of the U.S, one might argue, as in Glaeser et. al. (2000), that regions share common 
pools of both capital and labor. If so, increases in private capital can arise not only from regional 
savings but also from inflows of capital if the net return to capital rises above that of other 
regions; and labor can also flow from one region to another in response to shifts in both wages 
and what Glaeser et. al. (2000) call “quality of life’—which declines with population, as positive 
amenities are congested, disamenities rise, and local land rents are driven up.—as in Roback 
(2007), The interplay between quality of life and land rents on the one hand and productivity on 
the other yields a spatial equilibrium in which equilibrium wages and per capita incomes can 
differ across regions, even in the absence of costs to spatial movements by firms or workers. 
Here, we are concerned primarily with effects on steady-state growth of per capita income, not 
with disentangling the separate dynamics of income and population growth, which interact to 
determine growth of per capita income. (In any event, our estimates are insensitive to whether a 
variable for population growth is included). 
  Data and empirical specifications 
 
                                                 
3 Romer (1987) and others have argued that education and knowledge might be a source of increasing 
returns through influence on A, the technology parameter.  We do not propose a test of that hypothesis 
here. 
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Our dependent variable is GROWTH, the (log %) growth in real personal income per capita 
in each state.  The key fiscal variables are TAXES, the ratio of all state and local taxes to state 
personal income. Again, TAXES also becomes the reference variable when it is replaced by the 
remainder of the government budget constraint, and eliminated from the estimated equation. 
Thus, the effect of a change in any element of the budget constraint is estimated net of the effect 
of a compensating change in taxes. Other fiscal variables are: FEES, the ratio of state and local  
fees  to personal income; FED, the ratio of federal governmental transfers to personal income; 
EDUC, the proportion of personal income devoted to public expenditures on education (both 
higher education and k-12); PROD, the proportion of personal income devoted to public 
expenditures on all ‘non-consumption” goods, i.e. excluding EDUC; we refer to PROD here as 
‘infrastructure,’ both physical and ‘institutional, e.g. public safety and judicial systems;4  
OTHER, which primarily represents public transfer-payment, health, welfare, and other 
entitlement programs; and finally, SURPLUS represents any budget surplus, expressed as a 
proportion of personal income (negative if a deficit).5  Also, we find, as in Gray, et. al. (2006), 
that fixed effects for both state and period heterogeneity are important, so all specifications 
include fixed effects for both state and period. In addition, we include lagged GROWTH to 
account also for unobserved time-varying (or state-dependent) heterogeneity. 
Our data for state fiscal variables are from the Census of Governments at five-year 
intervals from 1957 through 2007;from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (for the state 
unemployment rate);and from the Department of Commerce (for state real personal income per 
                                                 
4 Consistent with the complementarity Hanushek and Woessman (2007) find for education and institutional 
infrastructure, we include expenditures on both physical and institutional infrastructure in PROD. 
5 Also, consistent with other studies (e.g., Helms 1985 and Mofidi-Stone 1990), we treat UI expenditures as outside 
the regular fiscal structure, in part because UI is largely driven federally, with separate accounting. A surplus (or 
deficit) is included as an auxiliary control, as noted above, and results are insensitive to inclusion or exclusion. 
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capita.) We exclude Alaska as an exceptional outlier due to the idiosyncratic dominance of the 
Alaska pipeline and extreme variance in its state fiscal variables relative to the other 49 states. 
        Thus, for most variables we have data for 49 states at five-year intervals from 1957 to 
2007. Table1 presents summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. The 
average value for GROWTH for the five-year data interval is approximately 12.1 %, roughly 
2.4% per annum.  The average value for TAXES is about 9.9%, with average values of 3.5% for 
OTHER, 7.4% for PROD, 6.4% for EDUC, 3.6% for FED, and 5.9% for UR. 
Dynamics and identification. 
      We take the following approach in specifying the dynamics for growth.  First, we assume 
a priori that the current five-year growth rate is not significantly affected by contemporaneous 
fiscal variables, but is a function of the fiscal variables from previous periods.  Thus, for 
example, real personal income growth per capita between 1962 and 1967 is unaffected by 
contemporaneous values of fiscal variables. Mofidi and Stone (1990) successfully employ this 
recursive approach for five-year data for states. Eberts and Stone (1992) and Mark et al. (2000) 
employ a similar recursive strategy with annual data – the former for major U.S. metropolitan 
areas, and the latter for jurisdictions in the District of Columbia metropolitan area.  In addition, 
Glaeser et. al. (2000) and Bleaney et. al. (1991, 2001) employ recursive structures for a panel of 
OECD countries. Our base specification has 25-year lags, i.e. we first use average values over 
the previous 25 years. For education, this generation-length lag incorporates a full cohort of 
kindergarten through college students, as well as ‘time-to-build’ factors in education. We find 
similar results, however, if shorter lags are also incorporated, or used instead. Use of such long 
lags in a recursive structure substantially mitigates issues of endogeneity and spurious 
correlations arising from short-term, cyclical factors.  Even so, we further mitigate these by 
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including the state unemployment rate,6 both state and period fixed effects, and a lagged 
dependent variable to account also for time-varying, or state-dependent heterogeneity, which 
might otherwise yield spurious correlations between growth and the lagged fiscal variables. We 
use instrumental-variable techniques and generalized method- of-moments (GMM) estimators to 
account for the inconsistency of dynamic fixed-effects models in samples with a finite number of 
time periods. In our case, the number of periods is well below the number of states included, so 
the Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995) style GMM estimators are appropriate. 
These GMM estimators use lagged values of the dependent variable and exogenous (or 
predetermined) regressors as instruments. 
Regression & GMM Results 
 
      Tables 2a and 2b present regression and GMM instrumental- variable estimates, 
respectively—where the number of discrete five-year interval lags follow in parenthesis and any 
other number following a variable indicates the number of prior years over which the lagged 
value of a variable is averaged. Again, our dependent variable is GROWTH, the log-change in 
state real personal income per capita (times 100).  the fiscal variable omitted from the estimated 
equation in Tables 2a-2b  is (TAXES plus FEES), the ratio of state and local taxes and fees to 
personal income (times 100), so that changes in expenditures for any fiscal category  are 
implicitly financed by taxes and/or fees.   
Again, the estimates in Tables 2a-2b include fixed effects for period and state, as well as 
time-varying effects captured by lagged GROWTH.7 Robust (panel-corrected) standard errors 
are presented. The coefficients for lagged education expenditures (EDUC25) and lagged 
                                                 
6 The unemployment rate is a particularly good control for primarily cyclical or short-term, idiosyncratic influences 
because it tends to be strongly mean reverting, i.e. tends to exhibit exhibits long-run stationarity. 
7 Inclusion or exclusion of lagged growth has little effect on the estimates. 
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expenditures on public infrastructure (PROD25) are both significantly negative, but their 
complementary effect, the coefficient for (EDUC25*PROD25) is significantly positive.  The 
combined impact of the direct and complementary effects is also significantly positive for both 
EDUC25 and PROD25, evaluated at sample means. The growth effect of tax expenditures on 
welfare, transfer-payment and other entitlement programs, (i.e., OTHER 25, is significantly 
negative. And the coefficient for federal  transfers (FED25) is significantly positive.  The GMM 
and OLS estimates yield roughly similar coefficients, and The J statistic in Table 2b for a test of 
the over-identifying GMM restrictions fails to reject them.   
Growth hills and complementarity for education and infrastructure 
 
Due to the collinearity of the elements of the government budget constraint, one cannot 
estimate the growth hill for taxes predicted by the Barro model in a straightforward way while 
simultaneously estimating the effects of tax-financed expenditures on education and 
infrastructure. To do this, the empirical specification must be modified to include taxes, 
education and infrastructure, as well as all other elements of the government budget constraint. 
Doing so is impossible over strictly the same time period, since the elements of the balanced 
budget constraint are perfectly collinear.  We circumvent this problem by exploiting the length of 
our data to identify two different time horizons, which is feasible if the lagged effects are 
insensitive to the differences in length of lag, which appears to be the case.  First, as in Tables 
2a-2b, we focus on 25-year lags for EDUC and PROD, and second, on shorter, (five-year) lags 
for taxes and all other elements of the government budget constraint except education and 
infrastructure. Thus, we are able to estimate the effect of tax expenditures, lagged five years, 
which are implicitly spent on education and infrastructure during that period. 
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We specify the growth hill for taxes as a quadratic, with an (expected) positive linear 
term and negative quadratic term, respectively. Tables 3a and 3b present OLS and GMM 
estimates, respectively. Despite the changes in specification, estimates for education and 
infrastructure are reassuringly similar to those in Tables 2a-2b, indicating that estimates are not 
highly sensitive to length of lag. The J-statistic again fails to reject the over-identifying GMM 
restrictions, and the tax coefficients do, in fact, exhibit a growth hill, with a positive linear effect 
and negative quadratic effect, as predicted. That is, growth initially rises with tax expenditures 
on EDUC and PROD (which jointly are the omitted fiscal category in Tables 3a-3b), reaches a 
peak (near the sample mean for taxes), and then declines. Indeed the marginal effect of tax 
expenditures is significantly negative at the upper range of current state taxes, (e.g. New York 
and Massachusetts). This estimated growth hill is illustrated in Figure 1 for both in- and out-of-
sample ranges of taxes. The outer portions of the upward and downward sloping segments differ 
significantly from both zero and the peak of the growth hill. 
More on Growth hills and complementarity   
 
The scale diseconomies for tax expenditures predicted by the Barro model and evident in 
 
Tables 3a-3b can also be seen in Tables 4a-4b, which include a quadratic term for the interaction 
 
between education  and infrastructure. The interaction is initially significantly positive as  
 
before, but the quadratic interaction term in Tables  4a-4b for the scale of expenditures (and  
 
implicitly taxes) is negative . 
 
Thus, the growth hill found explicitly for taxes in Tables 3a-3b is evident explicitly for  
 
 
 education and infrastructure as well . (in Tables 4a-4b)  
 
Three primary forces interact in the Barro model to determine the shape of the  
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growth hill):  1) taxes tend to depress the net return to capital, But 2) tax-financed public  
 
investments are complementary with private capital, tending to raise the return to private  
 
capital, yet 3) Individually, both public and private capital are subject to diminishing  
 
marginal returns, even though together, they exhibit constant returns to scale.  
 
All three factors are identified in our empirical results, but we also identify a  
 
fourth factor introduced by our adaptation of the Barro model: The complementarity 
 
between public infrastructure and education. 
 
The various factors at play in the nonlinear growth-hill patterns, including those 
illustrated in Figure 1, are theoretically consistent with our adaptation of the Barro model, but 
need not all be found simultaneously in the data, so, the estimates appear to be particularly 
robust evidence of the interrelated factors at play in the growth-hill phenomenon.8  
Alternative specifications and robustness tests 
 
Estimates for the effects of education and infrastructure on growth are insensitive to a 
variety of alternative specifications, including alternative lag structures, inclusion of short-term 
cyclical variables such as the unemployment rate, controls for time-varying heterogeneity via a 
lagged dependent variable, or to GMM instrumental-variable techniques. Estimates are also 
insensitive to the inclusion of lagged five -year population growth, suggesting that growth effects 
of public investments in education and infrastructure do not work primarily through changes in 
population.  
  
                                                 
8 The estimates are also consistent with the local ‘revenue hills’ found for cities by Haughwout, et. al. (2004) 
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Concluding remarks. 
 
 Complementarity between private and public capital lies at the core of the Barro model 
of endogenous growth. In this paper we explore an additional source of complementarity: 
between public infrastructure and education. The independent effect of expenditures on either 
alone, net of the effects of the taxes necessary to support them, appears to be negative for growth 
in per capita income. However, the complementarity between public infrastructure and education 
is positive enough for the total effect of either to be significantly positive, except at large scales, 
where we find significant diseconomies. Taken at face value, our findings suggest that such 
complementarities make ‘coordinated’ public investments in “brains, drains and roads” a 
superior strategy at the state and local level. Our positive findings for investments in public 
education appear to run counter to other recent arguments—put forth prominently by Eric 
Hanushek (2007) and others that “resources “do not matter” in education.9 Indeed, effects of 
incremental investments in either public infrastructure or education on growth appear to be 
significantly positive at current levels of those investments. In subsequent work, it would be 
useful to investigate in greater detail the nature of the complementarity between education and 
public infrastructure, as well as perhaps, potential differences between  k-12 and postsecondary 
education. It would also be helpful to have more precise estimates of the various ‘threshold 
points’ for the scale economies and diseconomies (‘growth hills’ identified in Tables 3a-3b and 
4a-4b).  
  
                                                 
9 Brewer (1997) provides a review of evidence for this argument, along with a critique based on the role of 
unobserved heterogeneities in obscuring the role of resources.  Evidence here for investments in public education, 
along with complementary investments in public infrastructure is consistent with the view that resources can matter.  
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Table 1.  (49 States 1957-2007)   
Variable Means   
Variable Mean   
GROWTH 12.1 
 
  
EDUC 6.4   
PROD 13.9   
OTHER 3.5   
SURPLUS 0.1 
 
  
TAXES 9.9   
FEES 3.7   
FED 3.4   
UR 5.9   
Notes: see text for sources and 
explanation of data and variables.    
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Table2a.  OLS : Growth Effects of  Tax Expenditures on 
Education and Infrastructure (49 States 1957-2007) 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
std Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
C 83.36792* 20.81769 4.004668 0.0001 
GROWTH-1 
-
0.114941* 0.053714 -2.13987 0.0334 
EDUC25 -11.4112* 3.016751 -3.78261 0.0002 
PROD25 -3.111116 1.603839 -1.93979 0.0536 
EDUC25*PROD25 0.684651* 0.180865 3.78542 0.0002 
OTHER25 -2.137347 1.275286 -1.67598 0.0951 
FED25 1.235495* 1.375335 0.898323 0.3699 
UR 
-
2.386857* 0.214894 -11.1071 0 
Effects pecification 
Cross-section fixed 
dummy variables) 
 
Period fixed 
(dummy variables) 
 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH 
R-squared                      0.604952  
Adjusted R-squared        0.50322 
    S.D. 
dependent 
var 4.7134 
S.E. of regression 3.32202 
    Akaike info      
criterion 5.4215 
Sum squared resid 2571.4     Schwarz criterion 6.1857 
Log likelihood -735.10  
nobs      294  
*sig @5%, robust 
PeriodSUR std errors) 
 
See text for data and 
variables 
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Table2b . GMM: Growth Effects of 
Tax Expenditures on Education 
and Infrastructure 
(49 States 1957-2007) 
robust 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-
Statistic Prob.  
GROWTH-1 0.176748* 0.071614 2.467919 0.0143 
EDUC25 -10.171* 2.723781 -3.73439 0.0002 
PROD25 -2.71524* 1.262222 -2.15116 0.0325 
EDUC25*PROD25 0.62626* 0.156468 4.002431 0.0001 
OTHER25 -1.7334* 0.751326 -2.30708 0.0219 
FED25 0.85801 1.068592 0.80293 0.4228 
UR -2.2381* 0.199281 -11.1782 0 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (orthogonal 
deviations) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
Dependent Variable:     GROWTH 
 
 
R-squared 0.472771                 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4479 
     
S.D. dependent 
var 4.8795 
S.E. of regression 3.62571 
     
Sum squared 
resid 3063 
J-statistic 15.9945 
    Instrument 
rank 21 
no. observations 245 
* sig @5%, robust, White Period std errors 
See text for data and variables 
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Table 3a.  (OLS)Growth hills and tax expenditures on education and infrastructure 
(49 States, 1957-2007) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
t-
Statistic Prob.   
C 45.10316* 21.83251 2.065871 0.04 
GROWTH (-1) -0.13312 0.055033 
-
2.418918 0.0163 
EDUC25 2.875417 
-
2.852117 0.0047 
PROD25 -1.949309 1.441387 
-
1.352384 0.1776 
EDUC25*PROD25 0.478536* 0.17577 2.722511 0.007 
TAXES(-1) 3.990071 2.07161 1.926072 0.0553 
TAXES(-1)^2 -0.2035 0.087659 
-
2.321507 0.0211 
OTHER25 -2.532344 1.096552 
-
2.309369 0.0218 
FED(-1) 1.44332 0.656361 2.198973 0.0289 
UR -2.170226 0.205564 
-
10.55742 0 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH 
R-squared 0.637693     S.D. dependent var 4.713261
Adjusted R-
squared 0.54045 
    Akaike info 
criterion 5.348538
S.E. of regression 3.195124 
Sum squared resid 2358.236 
Log likelihood -723.235 
nobs 294 
* sig @5%, robust, White Period std errors 
See text for data and variables 
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Table 3b . (GMM) Growth Hills and Tax Expenditures on education and 
infrastructure 
(49 States 1957-2007) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GROWTH-1 0.322531* 0.162104 1.989657 0.0478 
EDUC25 -14.39457 4.650246 -3.095444 0.0022 
PROD25 -3.256282 1.456721 -2.235351 0.0264 
EDUC25*PROD25 0.794311* 0.231573 3.430064 0.0007 
TAXES-1 15.04109 6.794626 2.213675 0.0278 
TAXES-1^2 -0.571242 0.274635 -2.080007 0.0386 
OTHER25 -2.596186 2.277082 -1.140138 0.2554 
FED-1 0.90145* 2.577435 0.349762 0.7268 
UR -2.400* 0.268735 -8.93047 0 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (orthogonal deviations) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH 
R-squared 0.339052     Mean dependent var 0.783551 
Adjusted R-squared 0.301856     S.D. dependent var 4.87951 
S.E. of regression 4.077074     Sum squared resid 3839.805 
J-statistic 14.42138     Instrument rank 21 
Nobs                                                  245 
* sig @5%, robust, White Period std errors 
See text for data and variables 
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Table4a .  (OLS)  Scale Diseconomies 
(49 states, 1957- 2007) 
robust 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 51.12215* 18.59316 2.749514 0.0063 
GROWTH-1 
-
0.225054* 0.064641 -3.481618 0.0006 
EDUC-1 
-
7.430106* 3.513807 -2.114546 0.0351 
PROD(-1) 
-
3.400008* 1.5249 -2.22966 0.0264 
EDUC(-1)*PROD(-1) 0.666105* 0.306212 2.175306 0.0302 
(EDUC(-1)*PROD(-1))^2 -0.00077* 0.000366 -2.101604 0.0363 
FED(-1) 3.222522* 0.618192 5.212815 0 
OTHER(-1) 
-
2.089325* 0.504887 -4.138207 0 
UR(-1) 0.099116 0.276015 0.359094 0.7197 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy 
variables) 
 
Period fixed (dummy 
variables) 
 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH 
R-squared 0.479798  
Adjusted R-squared 0.391252 
    S.D. 
dependent 
var 5.508888 
 
S.E. of regression 4.29816 
    Akaike 
info 
criterion 5.88958 
Sum squared resid 6946.292 
    Schwarz 
criterion 6.492274 
Log likelihood -1233.652 
    F-
statistic 5.418679 
 
no. observations 441  
*significant at .05  
Note See text for explanation of 
data and variables standard errors 
are PCSE, Period SUR 
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Table4b.  (GMM) Scale Diseconomies 
(49 States, 1957-2007) robust 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GROWTH (-1) 0.053955 0.091485 0.589776 0.5557 
EDUC(-1) -7.757809* 1.984921 -3.908372 0.0001 
PROD(-1) -3.42985* 0.837822 -4.093768 0.0001 
EDUC(-1)*PROD(-1) 0.721885* 0.166484 4.336056 0 
(EDUC(-1)*PROD(-1))^2 -0.000806* 0.000199 -4.044571 0.0001 
OTHER(-1) -1.771894* 0.467081 -3.793544 0.0002 
FED(-1) 2.524942* 0.545215 4.631097 0 
UR 0.44927* 0.179876 2.497669 0.0129 
Cross-section fixed (orthogonal deviations) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
Dependent Variable:  GROWTH 
    S.D. dependent var 5.31545 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297224     Sum squared resid 7465.9393 
S.E. of regression 4.456032     Instrument rank 28 
J-statistic 23.76 
Nobs                                                          392 
*sig@.5% See text for data and variables. (robust, (White period std. errors) 
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Notes: See text for explanation of estimates, data, and variables.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Estimated "Growth Hill" U.S. States 
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